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The theory of integrative levels provides a general description of the evolution of
matter through successive orders of complexity and integration. Along its development,
material forms pass through different levels of organization, such as physical, chemical,
biological or sociological. The appearance of novel structures and dynamics during this
process of development of matter in complex systems has been called emergence.
Social neuroscience (SN), an interdisciplinary field that aims to investigate the biological
mechanisms that underlie social structures, processes, and behavior and the influences
between social and biological levels of organization, has affirmed the necessity for
including social context as an essential element to understand the human behavior. To
do this, SN proposes a multilevel integrative approach by means of three principles:
multiple determinism, nonadditive determinism and reciprocal determinism. These
theoretical principles seem to share the basic tenets of the theory of integrative levels
but, in this paper, we aim to reveal the differences among both doctrines. First,
SN asserts that combination of neural and social variables can produce emergent
phenomena that would not be predictable from a neuroscientific or social psychological
analysis alone; SN also suggests that to achieve a complete understanding of social
structures we should use an integrative analysis that encompasses levels of organization
ranging from the genetic level to the social one; finally, SN establishes that there can
be mutual influences between biological and social factors in determining behavior,
accepting, therefore, a double influence, upward from biology to social level, and
downward, from social level to biology. In contrast, following the theory of integrative
levels, emergent phenomena are not produced by the combination of variables from two
levels, but by the increment of complexity at one level. In addition, the social behavior
and structures might be contemplated not as the result of mixing or summing social
and biological influences, but as emergent phenomena that should be described with
its own laws. Finally, following the integrative levels view, influences upward, from biology
to social level, and downward, from social level to biology, might not be equivalent, since
the bottom-up processes are emergent and the downward causation (DC) is not.
Keywords: emergentism, integrative levels, multilevel integrative analysis, reductionism, social neuroscience
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INTRODUCTION
It is an old observation that living systems are structured
in hierarchical levels of organization, in which the entities
of one level are compounded into new entities at the next
higher level (O’Connor and Wong, 2012). This observation
has given rise to diverse theoretical constructs, among them
the concept of integrative levels, an idea that underwent an
interesting debate from the second half of the twentieth century
(Gerard and Emerson, 1945; Needham, 1945, 1986; Novikoff,
1945; von Bertalanffy, 1950; Feibleman, 1954; Gerard, 1957;
Mayr, 1982; Aronson, 1984). Physical, chemical, biological,
mental or sociological spheres have been proposed as primary
levels of organization (Emmeche et al., 1997, 2000). Several
sub-levels, such as molecules, organelles, cells, tissues, organs,
physiological systems, neural circuits and information processing
systems, psychological faculties and functions, memories...
and so on, have also been proposed (Kirmayer and Gold,
2011), and several mesoforms can also exist (Novikoff,
1945). It has been asserted that the development of matter
through its different forms of motion gives rise to new
integrative levels of complexity, whose emergent properties
appear only when the constituent elements of the lower
level are combined in the higher level (Novikoff, 1945).
Concepts such as emergence, nonlinearity, attractors and self-
organization have contributed to transform mechanistic and
reductionist views (Goldstein, 1999; Mazzocchi, 2008), and
current research in self-organizing non-linear dynamical systems
has impelled the scientific study of emergence, giving rise
to its final devitalization or demystification (Emmeche et al.,
2000).
According to the concept of emergence, the qualities of
complex systems cannot be derived from the characteristics
of the components alone: the whole is greater than the
sum of its parts, as classically expressed (Goldstein, 1999;
Van Regenmortel, 2004; Singer, 2007; Findlay and Thagard,
2012). Nevertheless, it has been argued that it is not proper
enough to say that the whole is more than the sum of
its parts: indeed, the properties of the parts cannot be
understood except in their context in the whole (Lewontin,
1993). On the other hand, the different levels of organization
are not completely delimited from each other (Novikoff, 1945;
Emmeche et al., 2000), which does not mean that levels do
not possess any ontological status. Indeed, integrative levels
of organization have been considered not only as levels of
description. On the contrary, an ontology of at least four
primary levels, physical-chemical, biological, psychological and
sociological, have been suggested (Emmeche et al., 1997).
Diverse and divergent points of view have been embraced
under the emergentist approach. Teilhard de Chardin, for
instance, incorporated in his philosophy the concept of emergent
levels with a teleological character, arguing that at each
further degree of combination, something that is irreducible to
isolated elements emerges in a new order, and incorporating a
mystical content according to which the evolution progresses
towards the consciousness (Teilhard de Chardin, 2008; Blitz,
2010).
LEVELS OF ORGANIZATION AND
EMERGENCE
The development of matter in the universe has been attributed
to the combination of the fundamental laws and a contribution
from historical accidents, and although to reduce one level to
the lower one—together with historical contingence—is possible
in principle, it does not by itself allow to understand the
world: at each level of organization new regularities emerge
that should be studied for themselves, and new phenomena
should be appreciated and valued at their own level. That is,
larger-scale phenomena have their own dynamics and therefore,
macro-level processes require their own language of description
(Gell-Mann, 2001; Kirmayer and Gold, 2011). In words of
Anderson (1972), the ability to reduce everything to simple
fundamental laws does not imply the ability to start from
those laws and reconstruct the universe. To define emergence
is not a trivial issue and a considerable amount of different
interpretations has been generated around this question since
J. S. Mill and later the British Emergentism started to address
it (Goldstein, 1999; O’Connor and Wong, 2012). However,
it is widely accepted that emergent properties are novel and
unpredictable from knowledge of their lower levels and they
cannot be explained or mechanistically reduced in terms of their
underlying properties (Kim, 1999). Emmeche et al. (1997, 2000)
considers that emergent levels are inclusive, that is, they do not
violate any physical laws and in addition, they permit the local
existence of different ontologies. What is more, emergent levels
not only violate any physical law, but they also might be obeying
fundamental physical laws throughout the successive levels: for
example, the general tendency of events towards ‘‘disorder’’ is
observable in any level of organization, although in organic
development and evolution, a transition towards states of higher
complexity and differentiation also occurs (von Bertalanffy,
1950). Certain characteristics of live matter, such as those related
to the basic necessities of living organisms—for instance survival,
security and exploration or search—might also function along
the entire development of life processes. In other words, while
certain physical or biological laws are only applicable to certain
levels of organization, other fundamental laws are applicable to
the matter along its entire development.
Emergence is, therefore, the arising of a higher-level
phenomenon from a lower system level, and hence, it is an
upward process. This upward causation is characterized by a
causal process leading from the lower level entities to the higher
level ones, so that the lower level can be considered as the
cause and the higher level as the effect (Emmeche et al., 2000).
However, emergent phenomena can feedback to lower levels,
causing changes through a process called downward causation
(DC; Campbel, 1974; Mayr, 1982; Emmeche et al., 2000), in
which wholes can affect properties of components at lower
levels.
The existence of different levels of organization does not
imply necessarily the existence of different substances, since
there is an unbroken continuity of material constitution
along the development of the different levels of complexity;
all of them are just part of a single (material) world
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(Kirmayer and Gold, 2011). Strong DC, based on a constitutive
irreductionism, considers that higher level entities acquire a
substantial existence qualitatively different from lower level
entities, but other forms of DC maintain that the higher levels
does not add any substance to the entities of the lower level
and that, in addition, constitutive irreductionism and substantial
realism of levels support an unscientific principle that infringe
the inclusivity of levels (Emmeche et al., 2000). In short, the
integrative levels describe a unique material world with many
hierarchical levels of complexity. In relation to the mind-body
question, the mind does not involve a different substance but,
ontologically, originates from the interactions of brain, body
and environment (Kirmayer and Gold, 2011). Asserting that
consciousness and mental states can be reduced to chemical
reactions taking place in the brain has been considered as
the most extreme manifestation of the reductionist view (Van
Regenmortel, 2004). The reductionist approach to study the
behavior of living beings—or of their alter ego, the brain—may
provoke the absurd feeling that the more precize the detail that is
discovered, the less acceptable it is to explain something complex
(Delgado-García, 2011). Perhaps experimental neuroscientists
are excessively focused toward the inside of the neuron in
search of the molecules that make possible learning or social
interactions and therefore, in the reasonable curiosity to find
at the lower integration level the explanation for a given
functional process, we might be at risk of forgetting the
search for the origin of emergent properties (Delgado García,
2015). Zaki and Ochsner (2012) have also remarked that
important problems may emerge when researchers rely on
overly simplified models of complex psychological phenomena,
especially when they try to ‘‘scale up’’ or extrapolate data
from such models into general conclusions. They consider that
complex cognitive phenomena are difficult, if not impossible,
to describe through data about their building blocks alone,
since these phenomena are greater than the sum of their
parts.
Other positions sustain that humans are embedded in
a complex network in which society, culture and history
are determinant factors, and although obviously the mind
depends on the brain, it cannot be isolable within it.
This position is not dualistic, since it does not admit the
existence of a different immaterial substance underlying these
mental phenomena, but it seeks to reject the old mechanical
materialism that pretends to reduce higher order phenomena
to lower ones, a kind of reductionism in which mind is
an epiphenomenon of the brain, as it was considered by
the mechanical materialists of the nineteenth century (Rose,
2012).
EMERGENCE OF HUMAN
CONSCIOUSNESS AND BEHAVIOR
The human brain, the most complex known structure, is
considered as a complex system in which mental states emerge
from the interaction between multiple physical and functional
levels (Bassett and Gazzaniga, 2011). But the human brain is
also embedded in the levels that surround it and therefore,
the nervous system, the body and the environment have
been contemplated as dynamical systems coupled with one
another on multiple levels, that is, mutually embedded systems
(Thompson and Varela, 2001). Moreover, in the brain, emergent
phenomena can feedback to lower levels (Bassett and Gazzaniga,
2011; Delgado-García, 2011), causing changes through DC. The
physiological effects produced by certain psychological states
have been proposed as an example of DC (Campbell and
Bickhard, 2011).
Vygotsky proposed that the mental functions along human
cultural development appear first on the social level, and later,
on the individual level. The higher functions originate, according
to him, as actual relations between human individuals. The
transformation of interpersonal processes into intrapersonal
ones would be, therefore, the result of a long sequence of
developmental events and the internalization of socially rooted
and historically developed activities is the distinctive feature of
human psychology, the basis of the qualitative leap from animal
to human consciousness (Vygotsky, 1978, 1986). The transition
of elementary to higher mental functions is—according to
Vygotsky—mediated by psychological tools, which have a
semiotic nature: language, systems for counting, writing,
algebraic symbol systems, and so on. Vygotsky’s description
of the origin of higher mental functions is greatly based on
these forms of mediation (Wertsch, 1985). When using the term
‘‘social’’, Vygotsky was referring to ‘‘face to face’’, dyadic or
small group communicative processes: interpsychological
processes. Nevertheless, he recognized another level of
social phenomena as well: ‘‘social institutional’’ processes,
as termed by Wertsch. Interpsychological processes are not
reducible to individual psychological processes, which would
constitute a form of psychological reductionism and likewise,
societal processes cannot be reduced to interpsychological
processes, which Wertsch considers another form of
reductionism.
SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE
Three decades ago, the social neuroscience (SN) started to
emerge as a new field, undergoing since then an important
expansion and growth. This new interdisciplinary field which
aims to investigate the biological—neural, hormonal, cellular,
and genetic—mechanisms that underlie social structures,
processes, and behavior and the influences between social
and biological levels of organization, has been considered
useful in several aspects of the social life, such as education,
health or public policy (Cacioppo and Decety, 2011) and
has received considerable attention from the media and the
general public (Stanley and Adolphs, 2013). This new focus
pervaded cognitive neuroscience giving rise to the social
cognitive neuroscience approach, which seeks to understand
phenomena in terms of interactions between social, cognitive
and neural levels of analysis (Ochsner and Lieberman, 2001).
SN has declared the necessity for including social context
as an essential element to understand the human behavior
and it has tried to overcome the purely biological stance of
some viewpoints introducing in its conceptual framework
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its doctrine of multilevel analysis (Cacioppo and Berntson,
1992).
SN has given rise to abundant scientific works, many of them
in the realm of neuroendocrinology. It has been established
that certain neuropeptides and steroid hormones have a sex-
specific effect on animal social behavior (Donaldson and Young,
2008; Insel, 2010; Bos et al., 2012; Goodson, 2013), modulating
social behavior and social cognition. Oxytocin and arginine
vasopressin (AVP)—so called ‘‘social neuropeptides’’—are
important modulators of diverse social behaviors, including
attachment, social recognition and aggression (Veenema and
Neumann, 2008; Heinrichs et al., 2009; Ebstein et al., 2012;
Goodson, 2013; Kelly and Goodson, 2014; Lieberwirth and
Wang, 2014). Neuropeptides have also been involved in the
etiology of autism spectrum disorders (Insel et al., 1999; Bartz
and Hollander, 2008; Green and Hollander, 2010; Meyer-
Lindenberg et al., 2011).
Oxytocin has been involved in the modulation of a wide
variety of behaviors in mammals, and humans in particular,
such as aggression, affiliation or social memory (Young and
Wang, 2004; Lee et al., 2009; Ross and Young, 2009), and
its role in social cognition in humans has been the focus of
extensive research in recent years (Guastella and MacLeod,
2012). Thus, the findings of SN in animal behavior have
led to the search for its human analoges. For instance,
it has been reported that oxytocin increases trust (Kosfeld
et al., 2005) and generosity (Zak et al., 2007) in males,
although, interestingly, oxytocin does not seem to uniformly
facilitate trust and pro-social behavior in humans, since it
may also impede trust and pro-social behavior depending
both on diagnosis and on chronic interpersonal insecurities
combined with situational factors (Bartz et al., 2011). Oxytocin
administration also increases ratings of trustworthiness and
attractiveness of male and female targets, suggesting that higher
levels of this nonapeptide may enhance affiliative behavior
towards unfamiliar others (Theodoridou et al., 2009). In an
acute administration study, fathers were more stimulating
of their child’s exploration than in the placebo condition,
and they tended to show less hostility (Naber et al., 2010).
Also, oxytocin significantly increased positive communication
behavior in relation to negative behavior during a couple
conflict discussion and significantly reduced salivary cortisol
levels after the conflict, when compared with placebo (Ditzen
et al., 2009). Oxytocin also seems to enhance the buffering
effect of social support on stress responsiveness (Heinrichs et al.,
2003). Furthermore, oxytocin has also been suggested to be a
key element in social motivation (Gordon et al., 2011), parochial
altruism (De Dreu et al., 2010) and cooperation within groups
(De Dreu, 2012). The pronounced reduction in activation and
amygdala–midbrain connectivity in males receiving oxytocin
revealed a marked impact of this neuropeptide on amygdala
reactivity and brainstem interactions in humans suggesting a
neural mechanism for its effects in social cognition (Kirsch
et al., 2005). Regarding memory, intranasal administration of
oxytocin specifically improved recognition memory for faces,
but not for non-social objects (Rimmele et al., 2009). On the
other hand, oxytocin has been reported to promote human
ethnocentrism—the tendency to view one’s group as centrally
important and superior to other groups—(De Dreu et al., 2011)
as well as increasing envy and schadenfreude (gloating; Shamay-
Tsoory et al., 2009). In addition, a role has been suggested for
this neuropeptide in group-serving dishonesty, a finding that
has been claimed to support a functional approach to morality
(Shalvi and De Dreu, 2014).
Regarding AVP, a regulator role has been reported for this
nonapeptide in maternal (Bosch and Neumann, 2010; Bosch,
2013) and intermale (Ferris and Potegal, 1988) aggression in
rodents. AVP seems to modulate intermale aggression eliciting
region-specific effects (Veenema et al., 2010), that is, by either
promoting or inhibiting aggression depending on the brain
region into which it is released. Although similar neurochemical
and neuroanatomical pathways are activated in mice and
humans, it has been argued that the enormous differences in
biology and social structure make it unlikely for mouse and
human aggression to be classified into homologous categories.
Furthermore, relating behavioral, neurobiological and molecular
mechanisms of aggression in non-human animals to the human
condition is not easy (Nelson and Trainor, 2007). AVP effects
appear to be sex-specific, promoting agonistic and affiliative
types of responses toward same-sex faces in men and women,
respectively (Thompson et al., 2006). Other studies have also
suggested that both behavioral and neural responses to intranasal
oxytocin and AVP are highly sexually differentiated (Rilling
et al., 2014). Intranasal AVP administration also enhances the
encoding of emotional facial expressions (Guastella et al., 2010)
and the cognition for sexual stimuli (Guastella et al., 2011) in
human males. A role for AVP in enhancing aggressive behavior
in personality-disordered individuals has been also suggested
(Coccaro et al., 1998).
It is considered that the amygdala plays a critical role in
the affective and motivational drive to respond aggressively to
social provocation, while the orbitofrontal cortex is thought
to be a self-regulatory region that inhibits aggressive impulses
(Mehta et al., 2013). Recently, it has been shown in behaving
mice and rabbits that the prefrontal cortex plays a restrictive
role in the release of spontaneous or recently acquired (i.e.,
learned) behaviors (Jurado-Parras et al., 2012; Leal-Campanario
et al., 2013). Testosterone has been associated to affiliative
behavior, stress response and social aggression. The effect of
testosterone on aggression has been explained by a reduction
in activity in the medial orbitofrontal cortex (Mehta and Beer,
2010). Although elevated testosterone levels have been positively
associated with aggressive behavior in animals, it has been
claimed that situationally induced fluctuations in testosterone
levels are more relevant to human aggression than stable
levels of testosterone (Mehta et al., 2013; Carre and Olmstead,
2015).
However, although there is some evidence suggesting a
role for testosterone in aggression, the results are controversial
and according to other authors, conflicting and inconclusive
(Eisenegger et al., 2011a). Thus, sublingual administration of
testosterone in women caused a substantial increase in fair
bargaining behavior, thereby reducing bargaining conflicts and
increasing the efficiency of social interactions. However, subjects
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who believed that they had received testosterone—regardless
of whether they actually received it or not—behaved much
more unfairly than those who believed that they had been
treated with placebo. Thus, folk beliefs about the effects
of testosterone—that testosterone induces antisocial, egoistic,
or even aggressive human behaviors—seem to generate that
unfairly behavior (Eisenegger et al., 2010), which highlights
the relevance of psychological factors on the results obtained
from neuroendocrinological studies. Earlier studies had also
suggested that testosterone causes expectations, rather than
inducing an actual increase in aggressiveness (Björkqvist et al.,
1994). These results have been criticized with the argument
that testosterone increases reactive aggression in men, but
not in women, and that social environment can moderate
testosterone-behavior associations (Josephs et al., 2011). In this
controversy, Eisenegger et al. have questioned the hypothesis that
testosterone causes aggressive motivation in men, arguing that
no sound evidence for a gender-specific effect of testosterone
on aggressive motivation exists. Instead, they have suggested
that testosterone drives a more general range of motivated
behaviors, often subsumed under the concept of dominance
behavior, that is, the motivation to achieve or maintain a high
social status, which appears to be non-aggressively achieved in
primates (Eisenegger et al., 2011a). Caution when interpreting
data from correlational studies is a common demand. For
instance, data from salivary testosterone levels in male and
female prisoners showed that inmates who had committed
personal crimes of sex and violence had higher testosterone
levels than inmates who had committed property crimes of
burglary, theft, and drugs, indicating a positive correlation
between endogenous testosterone levels and the exhibition
of aggressive, egoistic and anti-social behavior (Dabbs et al.,
1995; Dabbs and Hargrove, 1997). However it has been
argued that causality in these studies remains unclear, since
the higher levels of aggression might well have caused the
higher testosterone levels, leaving open the question about
the role of testosterone in this behavior (Eisenegger et al.,
2011b).
Other issues such as social decision making (Lee and
Harris, 2013), morality (Sobhani and Bechara, 2011; Young
and Dungan, 2012), reputation (Izuma, 2012) or empathy
(Singer and Lamm, 2009; Decety and Svetlova, 2012) are
being also addressed by SN. The SN approach on empathy
research has experienced a significant growth in the last
decade. Empathy has been defined as the experience of
vicariously feeling what another person is feeling without
confounding the feeling with one’s own direct experience
(McCall and Singer, 2013). Nevertheless, the term empathy
has been applied to many distinct phenomena, such as
knowing another person’s internal state, coming to feel as
another person feels, imagining how another is thinking
and feeling or feeling distress at witnessing another person’s
suffering (Batson, 2009). Others consider empathy as a set
of related but distinct processes through which ‘‘perceivers’’
(individuals focusing on another person’s internal states)
relate to ‘‘targets’’ (individuals who are the focus of perceivers’
attention). These processes are grouped into three broad
classes: experience sharing—vicariously sharing targets’
internal states—, mentalizing—explicitly considering (and
perhaps understanding) targets’ states and their sources—and
prosocial concern—expressing motivation to improve targets’
experiences—(Zaki and Ochsner, 2012). Zaki and Ochsner have
argued that relying too heavily on highly simplified models
may introduce interpretational confusion into existing models
of empathy. In addition, in the absence of brain—behavior
relationships, conclusions about the role of certain brain
regions in experience—sharing tasks may require reverse
inference. Therefore, many findings in this field depend for
their accurate interpretation on the incorporation of behavior
into the neuroscience of empathy. To avoid these and other
pitfalls, the above authors propose a few simple changes on
the focus, many of which are already gaining force within
a new generation of empathy studies (Zaki and Ochsner,
2012).
Oxytocin and AVP are being considered as promising
targets for clinical treatment approaches for social dysfunctions
such as autism, social anxiety disorder, borderline personality
disorder and schizophrenia (Meyer-Lindenberg et al., 2011).
Nevertheless, the acute administration techniques used in the
studies on humans have methodological problems: for instance,
it is not clear what proportion of hormone reaches the
brain or what is the exact relationship between the peripheral
measures and the central levels. The uncertainties surrounding
the intranasal administration of oxytocin invite to be cautious
when interpreting the data, and some authors have raised several
questions to be resolved. Do intranasal administrated hormones
reach the brain? Do they reach its receptors? What constitutes
a sufficient dose to ensure a behavioral effect? How do the
exogenous hormones interact with other substances? In this
sense, Churchland and Winkielman (2012) have argued that it
is unlikely that any widely acting hormone or neurotransmitter
will modulate complex mental processes specific to social
cognition. Instead, they propose explanations in terms of
more general mechanisms. For instance, higher-order social-
cognitive effects observed in humans might be due to the
anxiolytic effect triggered by oxytocin. For these authors, it is
doubtful that oxytocin directly influences complex human social
cognition.
Besides social behavior, it has been also suggested that
hormones can modulate moral behavior through their effects
on the brain, in addition to other factors such as genetic
polymorphisms, which can predispose to aggression and
violence. According to this reductionist view, the ‘‘moral
brain’’ would be a large functional network including
cortical (frontal, temporal and cingulated cortices) and
subcortical (amygdala, hippocampus and basal ganglia)
anatomical structures and accordingly, abnormal moral
behavior might arise from both functional and structural
brain abnormalities that should be diagnosed and treated
(Fumagalli and Priori, 2012). It has even been proposed a
genetic basis for political beliefs and in general, for numerous
aspects of the human social behavior. For instance, it has
reported that the serotonin transporter SLC6A4, the monoamine
oxidase A and the dopamine receptor D2 genes function
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might have an effect on voting preferences (Ebstein et al.,
2010).
Downward Causation in Social
Neuroscience
SN aims to study not only the biological mechanisms that
underlie social structures and behavior, but also the effects that
social level of organization exerts on the human physiology
and behavior (Cacioppo et al., 2011; Eisenberger, 2012, 2013).
For instance, it has been observed the effect of social isolation
in humans (Cacioppo et al., 2011) or the effect of stressful
environment on brain and behavior, suggesting that early life
stress induces structural changes—in particular, an increase
in the volume of the amygdala and a decrease in certain
sectors of the prefrontal cortex and hippocampus—(Davidson
and McEwen, 2012). In this context, epigenetic modifications
have been proposed as a possible mechanism involved in early
positive and negative social experiences, suggesting that early
social life experiences might induce epigenetic DNA changes
in the developing brain with lifelong impacts (Hoffmann and
Spengler, 2014). Epigenetics may be a mechanism through which
the social environment becomes embedded at a biological level
(Champagne, 2010).
Epigenetics has been considered as the climax in the process
of ‘‘socialization’’ of biological and neurobiological concepts as
well as the last frontier in the development of a narrative about
the sociality of the brain, and the discovery of a mechanism
mediating between environmental exposures, gene expression
and neuronal development, that might confirm many of the
insights of SN research since the 1990s (Meloni, 2014). An
emblematic study showed that maternal behavior in the rat can
alter the hippocampal glucocorticoid receptor (GR) expression
in the offspring, which concomitantly alters the hypothalamic-
pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis and the stress responsiveness
of these animals. Maternal behavior increases GR expression
in the offspring via increased hippocampal serotonergic tone
accompanied by increased histone acetyltransferase activity,
histone acetylation and DNA demethylation. In addition, cross-
fostering studies showed that pups exhibit the behaviors of foster
parents (Weaver et al., 2004). This study demonstrates that a
specific epigenetic state of a gene can be established through
early life experiences (Weaver, 2007). Regarding human studies,
a recent one examined epigenetic differences between a neuron-
specific GR promoter from a postmortem hippocampus obtained
from suicide victims with a history of childhood abuse, and
the same promoter from postmortem hippocampus obtained
from either suicide victims with no childhood abuse or from
controls. Hypermethylation of the GR gene was found among
suicide victims with a history of abuse in childhood, but not
among controls or suicide victims with a negative history of
childhood abuse (McGowan et al., 2009). These results are
consistent with evidence from other studies which suggests that
suicide has a developmental origin. They are also consistent with
the hypothesis that early life events can modify the epigenetic
state of genomic regions whose expression might contribute to
individual differences in the risk of psychopathology (McGowan
and Szyf, 2010). The ways in which social structures and socio-
economic differences literally get under the skin (and in the
brain), influencing the human physiology, has always been
relevant for sociological theory (Meloni, 2014). In this context,
we contemplate epigenetic changes, generated from the social
level onto the biological one, as a paradigm of DC. Top-down
social processes affecting biology might take place mostly via
epigenetic mechanisms.
From Animal Models to Human Research
Animal models have been foundational to the SN (Cacioppo
and Decety, 2011) and some consider that animal research will
continue to be important for resolving the critical questions
driving current work in humans (McCall and Singer, 2012).
Some studies suggest that the molecular pathways and neural
networks mediating social behavior are relatively conserved
throughout evolution in mammals (Weitekamp and Hofmann,
2014). In this context, the findings of neuroendocrinology on
animal behavior have promoted the search for its analoges in
humans. Nevertheless, although it is usual to look for ‘‘animal
models’’ of human disorders or to assume that findings in
animals can be extrapolated directly to humans, the translation
from animal models to human research might be built with
careful consideration of species differences, since although some
of the principles may be conserved, the details for social
organization need to be explored for each species, recognizing
the importance of diversity in the neural mechanisms for social
cognition (Insel, 2010). Regarding the studies with great apes,
experimental research has revealed important methodological
difficulties. A major methodological challenge of experimental
research in primate cognition is to design novel problems
for individuals and ecologically valid for the species. Also,
the findings of experimental research must be comparable
among different populations of individuals of the same species.
Nevertheless, primates are confronted with cognitive problems
that are not well matched with the cognitive abilities that have
evolved in their natural environments, sincemuch of the research
in primate cognition is conducted with captive populations in
the laboratory and enculturated apes. Thus, the generalization
of an experiment with laboratory animals to conspecifics in
the wild may be inaccurate, because captive individuals in their
human-designed environments might have developed a unique
set of cognitive skills (Tomasello and Call, 2011). Coinciding
with this opinion, other authors have argued that behavioral
studies designed to understand the neural bases of behavior
should use realistic social situations where animals interact as
they would in their natural habitats (Insel and Fernald, 2004).
Insel and Fernald (2004) have alerted against the tendency to
use simple behavioral assays to investigate complex behavior,
remarking that such assays can lead to misinterpretation of
results. Therefore, to use ethologically relevant tasks is necessary
to avoid anomalous results. The control of visual processing
over vomeronasal signals or the prevalence of cortical networks
over neuropeptide signals from the hypothalamus questions the
validity of the extrapolation of the results obtained in rodents to
higher primates or humans. Novikoff also argued that positions
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that confer on animals, even higher primates, certain human
attributes might fall in an erroneous anthropomorphism if they
transfer the higher level (social) into the lower level (biological),
overlooking the fundamental qualitative differences between
them and forgetting that only human societymight be considered
truly sociological (Novikoff, 1945).
The Doctrine of Multilevel Analysis
It has been argued that SN can provide a full explanation of
social behavior only through a multilevel integrative approach.
This doctrine of multilevel analysis is essentially based on
three principles (Cacioppo and Berntson, 1992; Cacioppo et al.,
2010). The first one is the principle of multiple determinism
according to which an event at one level of organization can
have multiple antecedents within or across levels of organization.
More generally, the principle of multiple determinismmeans that
we are unlikely to achieve a complete understanding of social
behavior if we limit analyses to any single level of organization.
It has been proposed as an example of this principle the role
of the endogenous opioid receptor system in drug use. It has
been reported both the contribution of individual differences
in the endogenous opioid receptor system in drug use and the
important role of social context, suggesting that both factors
are involved and according to the authors, the understanding of
drug abuse is incomplete if either level is excluded (Cacioppo
and Decety, 2011). The second principle is the nonadditive
determinism, which specifies that properties of the whole are
not always readily predictable from the properties of the parts.
The third principle, reciprocal determinism, specifies that there
can be mutual influences between biological and social factors
in determining behavior. For example, not only the level of
testosterone in nonhuman male primates has been shown to
promote sexual behavior, but the availability of receptive females
influences the level of testosterone in nonhuman primates.
According to this view, the understanding of mind and behavior
could be enhanced by an integrative analysis that encompasses
levels of organization ranging from genes to cultures.
The three principles in which the doctrine of multilevel
integrative approach is based seem to correspond to the
principles classically used to describe the integrative levels
of organization of the matter and the concept of emergence
(Novikoff, 1945; Feibleman, 1954; Gerard, 1957; Mayr, 1982;
Needham, 1986; Emmeche et al., 1997, 2000). The principle of
nonadditive determinism, which specifies that properties of the
whole are not always readily predictable from the properties
of the parts, corresponds to the concept of emergentism,
according to which, the collective behavior of a complex system
generates higher-level properties not directly predictable from
the lower-level behavior of the system. The principle of reciprocal
determinism, according to which there can be mutual influences
between biological and social factors in determining behavior,
relates to inter-level causation, and is consistent with the
concepts of upward and DC (Campbel, 1974). The principle
of multiple determinism, according to which an event at one
level of organization can have multiple antecedents within or
across levels, is consistent with the nature of the interdependence
among the different stages of material development. Multiple
relations of interdependence can take place inside the levels
(intra-levels) or between the levels (inter-levels).
CONCEPTUAL DIVERGENCES BETWEEN
SN AND THE THEORY OF INTEGRATIVE
LEVELS
Despite its recognition of the importance of the social influences
on brain and behavior, SN has been criticized for its tendency
to focus on lower-level biological phenomena, a fact that
has been considered as an important limitation of current
work in this discipline (Kirmayer and Gold, 2011). SN asserts
that combination of neural and social variables can produce
emergent phenomena that would not be predictable from a
neuroscientific or social psychological analysis alone (Cacioppo
et al., 2010). Nevertheless, it might be considered another
point of view, suggesting that emergent phenomena are not
produced by the combination of variables from two levels, but
by the increment of complexity at one level. In this sense,
emergence has been defined as the arising of novel and coherent
structures, patterns, and properties during the process of self-
organization in complex systems (Goldstein, 1999). According
to this view, emergence describes the passage between levels, and
thus emergent properties would not arise from the combination
of two levels but from the collective behavior of complex systems
(Emmeche et al., 1997). Novikoff (1945) also considered laws
as unique for each level, not as combinations of laws from
other ones.
Second, SN suggest that to achieve a complete understanding
of social behavior we cannot limit analyses to any single level of
organization, but instead, we should use an integrative analysis
that encompasses levels of organization ranging from the genetic
level to the social one (Cacioppo et al., 2010). Nevertheless, to
understand one level, the theory of integrative levels suggest
to use methods of research and analysis appropriate to that
particular level, not to encompass or to ‘‘mix’’ all the levels
of organization (Novikoff, 1945; Feibleman, 1954; Needham,
1986). It has been alleged that in the human behavior both,
social and biological influences operate (Cacioppo et al., 2010).
However, to propose that several factors operate does not explain
what ‘‘determines’’ human behavior. It could be argued that
it is the ‘‘sum’’ of those factors, but it would not agree with
the principle of nonadditive determinism, which recognizes
that the whole is not the sum of the parts. In contrast, the
human behaviormight be contemplated—following the theory of
integrative levels—not as the result of mixing or summing social
and biological influences, but as an emergent phenomenon that
might be described with its own laws.
The principle of reciprocal determinism establishes that there
can be mutual influences between biological and social factors in
determining behavior. Therefore, it accepts a double influence,
upward from biology to social behavior, and downward, from
social level to biology. However, we argue that those two
processes bottom-up and up-downmay not be comparable, since
the first one, unlike the second one, is emergent, and an emergent
process cannot be predicted, a priori, from the laws of the lower
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levels (Novikoff, 1945; Emmeche et al., 1997, 2000; Kim, 1999;
O’Connor and Wong, 2012).
SN aims to find the biological mechanisms that underlie
social structures ranging from dyads and families to groups and
cultures (Cacioppo et al., 2010; Cacioppo and Decety, 2011).
Comprising all those levels—from dyads to cultures—under the
same ‘‘social structures’’ concept, might be imprecise, given the
huge ontological distance that separates dyads from cultures or
others large human organizational structures, a distance that
might even imply a different level of organization. Indeed, while
a dyad involves an interpsychological process related to an
interpsychological level, a large human organizational structure
might correspond to a ‘‘social institutional’’ process, related to
a ‘‘societal’’ level (Wertsch, 1985). In addition, some consider
that the data from acute administration neuroendocrinological
studies provide a promising picture of the central hormonal
influence on human social life (McCall and Singer, 2012). It
has also been claimed that understanding the neurobiology
and neurogenetics of social cognition and behavior may have
important implications for society (Donaldson and Young, 2008).
Nevertheless, the vast majority of the neuroendocrinological
studies refers to anonymous interactions and interpsychological
processes, ‘‘face to face’’, dyadic or small group communicative
processes, not to the level of social phenomena or ‘‘social
institutional’’ processes involving large social groups. Therefore,
the extent to which neuroendocrinology affects social structures,
social life or society should be more rigorously delimited. Even
though hormonal studies lacked methodological problems, they
would only be related to a very specific level of organization,
the one which relates to dyadic or small group processes,
but societal processes cannot be reduced to interpsychological
processes. For instance, we cannot use the same paradigms
to explain aggressiveness between two individuals—a dyadic
process—and aggressiveness between two social groups, classes
or cultures—societal processes (followingWertsch terminology).
Finally, we consider that the vague or imprecise use of the terms
social structures, social life or society, without the delimitation of
their exact scope, might lead to confusion, especially when the
results of SN reach the general public.
CONCLUSIONS
The theory of the integrative levels (Novikoff, 1945; Feibleman,
1954; Aronson, 1984; Needham, 1986) describes the evolution
of the matter, from the subatomic dimensions to the social
world, claiming that the increment in complexity is the result
of forces, different in each level, which can only be properly
described by laws which are unique for each level. Emergence
refers, therefore, to the arising of novel structures and properties
during the process of self-organization in complex systems. It is
not possible to understand the origins of the higher levels without
an understanding of the lower level phenomena as well. Thus,
integrative levels of organization allow us to know the evolution
from the inanimate to the animate and social worlds (Lobo,
2008). Nevertheless, knowledge of the lower levels does not make
possible to predict, a priori, what will occur at a higher level.
Therefore, the laws unique to a certain level can only be found
out using approaches appropriate to that particular level. When
suggesting some basic rules of explanation, Feibleman (1954)
also argued that every organization must be explained finally on
its own level, adding that organizations must be considered as
belonging in some peculiar way to its highest level. According
to Goldstein, it is necessary to appeal to emergence when the
configuration of the components of a complex system offers a
more explanatory insight into the dynamics of the system than
do explanations based on the parts alone. Emergence is thus a
way to describe the need to go to the macro level and its unique
dynamics, laws, and properties in order to explain phenomena
more adequately (Goldstein, 1999).
In its basic theoretical formulation, SN has introduced the
basic principles that constitute the model of integrative levels,
encompassing them under the so called doctrine of multilevel
analysis (Cacioppo and Berntson, 1992; Cacioppo and Decety,
2011). In this article, we have aimed to expose the differences
between both doctrines, suggesting that the multilevel integrative
approach used by SN has significant discrepancies with the
classical principles of integrative analysis—although apparently
it has common arguments.
First, SN asserts that combination of neural and social
variables can produce emergent phenomena that would not
be predictable from a neuroscientific or social psychological
analysis alone (Cacioppo et al., 2010). Nevertheless, following
the classical integrative analysis, emergent phenomena are not
produced by the combination of variables from two levels, but by
the increment of complexity at one level. In addition, SN suggests
that to achieve a complete understanding of social structures
we should use an integrative analysis that encompasses levels
of organization ranging from the genetic level to the social one
(Cacioppo et al., 2010). Perhaps, the concept ‘‘social structure’’
should be more exactly delimited. In addition, the theorists of
integrative analysis have suggested that organizations must be
explained on its own level, that is, its highest level of organization
(Feibleman, 1954). Likewise, the social behavior and structures
may be considered not as the result of mixing or summing social
and biological influences, but as emergent phenomena that might
be described with its own laws. SN establishes that there can
be mutual influences between biological and social factors in
determining behavior. Therefore, it accepts a double influence,
upward from biology to social level, and downward, from social
level to biology. However, those two influences might not be
situated in the same explanatory nor causal level, because those
two processes are not equivalent: the bottom-up processes are
emergent and the DC is not.
Finally, SN considers that the data from
neuroendocrinological studies provide an adequate explanation
of the central hormonal influence on human social life. However,
several observations might be indicated here. First, extrapolation
from animal studies might be erroneously formulated if simple
behavioral assays are used to investigate complex behaviors.
In addition, the vast majority of the neuroendocrinological
human studies are addressing interpsychological processes, ‘‘face
to face’’, dyadic or small group communicative processes, not
social phenomena or ‘‘social institutional’’ processes involving
large social groups. Even though hormonal studies lacked
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methodological problems, they would only be related to that
specific level of organization, not to the societal one. If we
consider that social events have their own dynamics, creating a
direct or indirect bridge between these events and the amount
of a certain biological factor may lead us to a simple and flawed
position.
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